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SENTENCING GUIDELINES
IN ENGLAND AND WALES:
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AND
EMERGING ISSUES
JULIAN V. ROBERTS*
I
INTRODUCTION
To date, scholarship on sentencing guidelines has understandably focused
on the experiences across the United States, where guidelines have been
evolving since the 1970s. Unlike other American innovations, the U.S. guideline
schemes have failed to find a market outside of the United States. Canada
explicitly rejected the use of presumptive guidelines in the 1980s, Western
1
Australia in 2000, while England and Wales declined their adoption in 2008.
Having rejected the U.S. model, a number of other jurisdictions have been
2
developing guideline schemes of different kinds. Among these countries,
England and Wales has made the greatest progress; definitive guidelines have
3
now been issued for most offenses. In fact, this is the only jurisdiction outside
the United States to have developed and implemented a comprehensive system
of guidance, consisting of offense-specific guidelines as well as generic
4
guidelines. This article describes and explores recent developments in
5
England.
Although the effects of various reforms and specific guidelines have been
studied for decades, it is too early to draw definitive conclusions about the
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Research Fellowship from the Leverhulme Trust. I would like to thank the participants of the Haifa
seminar for comments on a presentation based on an earlier draft of this article.
1. See generally Julian V. Roberts, Structuring Sentencing in Canada and England and Wales: A
Tale of Two Jurisdictions, 23 CRIM. L.F. 319 (2012).
2. A guideline scheme based upon starting sentences was proposed in Israel. See Oren GazalAyal & Ruth Kannai, Determination of Starting Sentences in Israel—System and Application, 22 FED.
SENT’G REP. 232, 232 (2010). This system has yet to be implemented, although reform legislation was
passed in January 2012.
3. The Law Commission of New Zealand has developed a comprehensive and thoughtful set of
guidelines, but these have yet to be implemented. See Warren Young & Claire Browning, New
Zealand’s Sentencing Council, 2008 CRIM. L. REV. 287.
4. All guidelines are available at the website of the Sentencing Council, http://sentencingcouncil.
judiciary.gov.uk/.
5. Hereinafter, for the sake of brevity, I will refer to this jurisdiction simply as England, but with
no disrespect to my Welsh forefathers intended.
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impact of English sentencing guidelines in practice. This observation will
surprise scholars who have been aware of the evolving English guidelines since
1999. Why, one may reasonably ask, are we only now beginning to understand
the effects of these guidelines? The explanation lies in fact that until relatively
recently, the guidelines authority in this jurisdiction lacked the mandate and the
resources to monitor the application of its own guidelines. Fortunately, this
state of affairs is now changing.
A. Overview of Article
Developments in England carry important lessons for other jurisdictions,
particularly those interested in structuring sentencers’ discretion without
adopting a U.S.-style sentencing grid. Part I offers some brief commentary on
the historical origins of the guidelines. This is followed by a concise chronology
of recent events, including passage of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009. This
Act amended the compliance requirement on courts and created a new
statutory guidelines authority that commenced its work in April 2010.
The Sentencing Council of England has significantly broader powers and
responsibilities than its predecessors, and correspondingly has greater research
resources as well. The Council has revamped the guideline structure and the
new format is described using a common offense to illustrate the English
sentencing methodology. The final section of the article addresses some
important challenges confronting the English guidelines and the Sentencing
Council. This includes the way in which guidelines and guidelines authorities
respond to novel or unexpected waves of criminality that have the potential to
create a “punitive surge.” England was confronted with such a scenario in
August 2011 when riots took place in many cities, and I describe the role and
response of the courts and the guidelines. To the extent possible, the discussion
is situated within the context of the guideline schemes found in the United
States and proposed in New Zealand.
B. The Context
Like judges in almost all other common law jurisdictions, sentencers in
England have long enjoyed wide discretion, restricted only by appellate review
and a limited number of mandatory sentences. All of this changed in 1998 with
the creation of an advisory body, the Sentencing Advisory Panel (SAP), a
development that marked the inception of more structured sentencing. The
SAP was responsible for advising the Court of Appeal Criminal Division, which
6
then considered this advice in developing its guideline judgments. In 2003, the
guidelines movement shifted up a gear when the Criminal Justice Act 2003
7
created a second statutory body, the Sentencing Guidelines Council (SGC).
6. See ANDREW ASHWORTH, SENTENCING AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 38 (William Twining et al.
eds., 5th ed. 2010); Andrew Ashworth, The Sentencing Guideline System in England and Wales, 19 S.
AFR. J. CRIM. JUST. 1, 2 (2006).
7. See Criminal Justice Act, 2003, c. 44, § 167.
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Henceforth, the SAP provided its advice to the SGC, which then devised and
ultimately issued definitive guidelines following extensive consultation. The
8
next important step occurred with passing the Coroners and Justice Act 2009.
The reforms introduced by the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 may be traced
to two developments. First, the high and rising prison population in England
prompted the government to commission a review of the use of imprisonment
9
and of sentencing guidelines. The second development was creating a Working
Group, which recommended a revamp of the current arrangements, rather than
10
adoption of a completely new system of guidelines. U.S.-style sentencing grids
were rejected by the Sentencing Commission Working Group as being
inappropriately restrictive and contrary to the traditions of English sentencing.
The rather unwieldy, bicameral structure comprised of the SAP and the SGC
was reviewed in 2008 by the Sentencing Commission Working Group (SCWG),
which recommended a series of modifications to the guidelines environment in
11
this jurisdiction. Sentencing in England entered another era in 2010 as a result
of reforms introduced by the Coroners and Justice Act 2009. A new statutory
body, the Sentencing Council for England, replaced the SAP and the SGC. The
creation of a single guidelines authority was intended to promote more effective
development and dissemination of guidelines. A great deal has changed as a
result of the latest legislation—for example, the Sentencing Council has a
significantly wider range of duties than its predecessors.
C. Statutory Duties of the Sentencing Council
The Coroners and Justice Act 2009 imposes a wide range of duties on the
12
new Council, in addition to the primary function of producing guidelines. The
Council also has to monitor the operation and effects of its guidelines.
Additionally, it must draw conclusions about the factors that influence
sentences imposed by the courts, the effect of the guidelines on consistency in
sentencing, and the effect of the guidelines on public confidence in the criminal
justice system. Promoting public confidence is also a priority for the new
Council. A number of commentators have argued that this is a central function

8. Coroners and Justice Act, 2009, c. 25.
9. See LORD CARTER OF COLES, SECURING THE FUTURE: PROPOSALS FOR THE EFFICIENT
AND SUSTAINABLE USE OF CUSTODY IN ENGLAND AND WALES (2007), available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/05_12_07_prisons.pdf.
10. SENTENCING COMM’N WORKING GROUP, SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN ENGLAND AND
WALES: AN EVOLUTIONARY APPROACH (2008), available at http://www.parliament.wa.
gov.au/intranet/libpages.nsf/WebFiles/ITS+-+sent+councils+report+evolutionary+approach+08/$FILE/
sentencing-guidelines-evolutionary-approach.pdf.
11. Id. For further discussion of the events leading up to creation of the Sentencing Council, see
generally Andrew Ashworth, Sentencing Guidelines and the Sentencing Council, 2010 CRIM. L. REV.
389; Julian V. Roberts, Sentencing Guidelines and Judicial Discretion: Evolution of the Duty of Courts
to Comply in England and Wales, 51 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 997 (2011).
12. Sections 127–30 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 specify a list of “other functions” of the
Council. Coroners and Justice Act, 2009, c. 25, §§ 127–30.
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of a sentencing guidelines authority. It has been suggested that sentencing
councils and commissions need to do more than simply devise and distribute
guidelines—they have to be promoted to stakeholders in the field of sentencing
as well as to the general public. The Coroners and Justice Act 2009 also states
that the Council “may promote awareness of matters relating to the sentencing
of offenders . . . in particular . . . the cost of different sentences and their relative
14
effectiveness in preventing re-offending.”
The Sentencing Council is required to publish a report about “nonsentencing factors” that are likely to have an impact on the resources needed
15
for sentencing. These non-sentencing factors include (but are not limited to)
recalls of prisoners released to the community, breaches of community orders,
patterns of re-offending, decisions taken by the Parole Board of England, and
16
considerations relating to the remand prison population. Finally, the Council is
also charged with assessing the impact of all proposed government policies and
legislation that may affect the provision for prison places, probation, and youth
17
justice services. Taken together, the tasks represent a radical departure from
the far more restricted duties of the previous organizations responsible for
18
devising and disseminating sentencing guidelines. The ensemble of duties is
also more extensive than those imposed upon sentencing commissions and
councils in other jurisdictions.
II
SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN ENGLAND: THE NEW FORMAT
The Council’s first definitive guideline, covering the offenses of assault,
19
came into effect on June 13, 2011. This guideline replaced the definitive assault
guideline issued by the Sentencing Guidelines Council in 2008. The guideline
assumes a new structure and will serve as a model for all future guidelines
issued by the Council. The Council has now issued a number of other offensespecific guidelines, including drugs and burglary. Over time, the Council will reformat and re-issue the existing guidelines in the new format; however, since
definitive guidelines must be preceded by an extensive public and professional

13. See, e.g., MIKE HOUGH AND JESSICA JACOBSON, CREATING A SENTENCING COMMISSION
FOR ENGLAND AND WALES: AN OPPORTUNITY TO ADDRESS THE PRISONS CRISIS (2008).
14. Coroners and Justice Act, 2009, c. 25, § 129(2).
15. Id. § 131(1).
16. Id. § 131(4).
17. Id. § 132(1).
18. Despite its expanded range of duties, the new Council is a smaller body than its predecessors.
The SAP–SGC had a combined membership of up to twenty-five members while the new Council is
composed of fifteen individuals: seven members of the judiciary (six judges and one lay magistrate), six
criminal justice professionals, one academic, and is headed by its President—the Lord Chief Justice of
England and Wales.
19. The definitive assault guideline as well as all guidelines issued by the previous statutory
authority may be found at http://www.sentencingcouncil.org.uk.
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20

consultation, it will take several years before all the guidelines issued by the
previous Council are replaced. For the foreseeable future, then, sentencers in
England will need two sets of guidelines on hand when sentencing, with the
relevant guideline being determined by the offense for which the sentence is
being imposed.
A. General Approach to Structuring Sentencers’ Discretion
Sentencing consistency is pursued in various ways in different guidelines.
Some systems—such as those found in U.S. jurisdictions—achieve consistency
by specifying ranges of sentences and by discouraging departures from those
21
ranges. In contrast, the guidelines in England promote uniformity at
sentencing by prescribing a sequence of steps for courts to follow when
sentencing an offender, while also allowing a significant degree of discretion.
Since the guideline reflects a structure derived from the statute, it is important
also to consider Section 125 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009, which
identifies the duties of a court with respect to the guidelines. The revised
guideline structure contains a series of nine steps, of which the first two are the
22
most critical.
B. Example: Domestic Burglary
The definitive guideline for domestic burglary illustrates the new guidelines
23
format. As with most offenses for which a definitive guideline has been issued,
this offense is stratified into three levels of seriousness. The guideline provides a
separate range of sentence and starting point sentence for each seriousness
category. Step one, and indeed section 125(3)(b) of the Coroners and Justice
Act, requires a court to match the case at bar to one of the three categories of
24
seriousness. The three categories reflect gradations in harm and culpability,
with the most serious category, category 1, requiring greater harm and
enhanced culpability. Category 2 is appropriate if either greater harm or higher
culpability is present, while category 3 requires a court to find that the case
being sentenced involves both lesser harm and a lower level of culpability.

20. See Coroners and Justice Act, 2009, c, 25, § 120(6).
21. See Andrew Ashworth, Techniques for Reducing Sentence Disparity, in PRINCIPLED
SENTENCING 243, 249–54 (Andrew von Hirsch et al. eds., 3d ed. 2009).
22. Appendix A, infra, contains a summary of the steps.
23. SENTENCING COUNCIL, BURGLARY OFFENCES: DEFINITIVE GUIDELINE (2011), available at
http://sentencingcouncil.judiciary.gov.uk/docs/Burglary_Definitive_Guideline_web_final.pdf. There is
an additional complication when sentencing for this offense. When sentencing an offender for a third
domestic burglary, the Court must apply section 111 of the Powers of the Criminal Courts (Sentencing)
Act 2000 and impose a custodial term of at least three years, unless it is satisfied that there are
particular circumstances relating to any of the offenses or to the offender that would make it unjust to
do so. Powers of the Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act, 2000, c. 6, § 111.
24. Coroners and Justice Act, 2009, c. 25, § 125(3)(b).
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C. Determining the Offense Category
Step one of the guideline identifies an exhaustive list of factors to determine
which of the three categories is most appropriate for the case being sentenced.
These factors constitute what the guideline describes as the “principal factual
elements of the offence,” and their primordial status is reflected in the fact that
determination of the category range is the step that has the greatest influence
on severity of sentence. This is clear from examining the respective category
ranges. For example, the lowest level of seriousness (category 3) carries a
sentence range running from a low-level community order to twenty-six-weeks
custody, whereas the highest category sentence range runs from two to six years
of imprisonment.
The step one factors relate to harm and culpability. Examples of factors
indicating greater harm include soiling, ransacking, or vandalizing the property
during the burglary, and committing the offense while the occupier is at home.
Factors indicating higher culpability include a significant degree of planning and
carrying a weapon. Lesser harm is indicated when the damage was limited or
nothing was stolen. Lower culpability circumstances include when the offender
was exploited by others or the offender had a mental disorder. The exhaustive
nature of the list of factors is an innovation, and means that courts are restricted
to considering only factors on the step one list when identifying which category
is appropriate. This feature of the guidelines may play an important role in
promoting a consistent approach to sentencing since it will restrict sentencers to
a limited list of factors. Having determined the relevant category range, a court
moves to step two.
At step two, the guideline provides a sentence range as well as a starting
point sentence for the range. Courts use the corresponding starting point
sentence to shape a sentence that will then be modified by the remaining steps
in the guideline. This essentially means moving up or down from the starting
point sentence to reflect relevant mitigating and aggravating factors. Since the
definition of a starting point has been amended by the Coroners and Justice Act
2009, it is worth briefly discussing the concept.
D. Using Starting Point Sentences
Starting point sentences are a feature unique to the guidelines in England.
Under the U.S. grid-based guidelines, crime seriousness and criminal history
comprise the two dimensions and each cell of the two-dimensional matrix
contains a range of sentence lengths. For example, in Minnesota, robbery
carries a presumptive sentence length of between fifty and sixty-nine months for
25
an offender with a single criminal-history point. With such narrow ranges of

25. The Minnesota guidelines consider many aspects of an offender’s record and accord points for
issues such as the recency of prior convictions, their relationship to the current conviction, and custody
status at the time of the latest conviction. MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMM’N, MINNESOTA
SENTENCING GUIDELINES (2004), available at http://www.msgc.state.mn.us/guidelines/guide04.doc.
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sentence length, starting points are presumably unnecessary and none are
provided. The only other jurisdiction to develop numerical guidelines is New
Zealand. The Law Commission of New Zealand created a comprehensive set of
26
guidelines, although these have yet to be implemented. When devising its
guidelines, the New Zealand Law Commission studied both the English and the
U.S. schemes and ultimately declined to incorporate starting points. Whence
the desire, and wherefore the necessity for such a feature in the English
guidelines?
Three justifications may be offered for starting point sentences. First, the
concept of a starting point derives from guideline judgments of the Court of
Appeal, which have been an element of appellate jurisprudence in England for
decades. Incorporating starting points links the guidelines to the traditional
source of guidance for courts of first instance, and this, in turn, may enhance the
appeal of the guidelines for sentencers. The second justification reflects the
psychology of human decision-making. Confronted with a range of options,
sentencers may well enter the range at different points, with consequences for
the sentences ultimately imposed, which could then be less consistent. Finally, if
the new format abandoned starting points entirely, courts would be required to
use two very different sets of guidelines—one with and one without this
27
defining feature.
E. Definition of Starting Point Sentence
The new guidelines format changes the definition of the “starting point”
sentence. The earlier SGC guidelines defined the starting point sentence in
terms of a first offender who is convicted following a trial. Practitioners and
scholars have often observed that this definition relies on a highly atypical
28
offender profile, as few offenders appear for sentencing following a contested
29
trial and without any criminal antecedents. The starting point for the Council’s
guidelines applies to all offenders, irrespective of plea or previous convictions.

26. See Warren Young & Andrea King, Sentencing Practice and Guidance in New Zealand, 22
FED. SENT’G REP. 254 (2010); Young & Browning, supra note 3.
27. I have already noted that two sets of guidelines are currently in operation, one being those
issued by the former council and not yet replaced by the Sentencing Council. If the two sets of
guidelines were radically different—for example, one with and the other without a starting point
sentence—sentencing would be even more challenging for courts.
28. See, e.g., Ian Edwards, Draft Sentencing Guidelines for Assaults, 174 CRIM. L. JUST. WKLY.
677, 677 (2010).
29. Exact statistics are not available, but in 2009, only fourteen percent of offenders appeared for
sentencing without any prior convictions. See MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, SENTENCING STATISTICS:
ENGLAND AND WALES 2009 at 82 (2010), available at http://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/
statistics/mojstats/sentencing-stats/sentencing-stats2009.pdf. Similarly, only thirty percent of defendants
in 2011 who entered a plea pleaded not guilty. MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, JUDICIAL AND COURT
STATISTICS 2011, at 47 (2012), available at http://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/statistics/courts-andsentencing/jcs-2011/judicial-court-stats-2011.pdf. The percentage of defendants pleading not guilty and
having no prior convictions is likely to be small.
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This change in the definition of the starting point found favor with respondents
30
to the professional consultation, and has been welcomed by practitioners.
F. Step Two: Shaping the Provisional Sentence
Step two of the guideline requires a court to “fine tune” its provisional
sentence (based on the category starting point) by reference to a list of
aggravating or mitigating factors that relate to crime seriousness, culpability, or
personal mitigation. In the words of the guideline, these circumstances provide
“the context of the offence and the offender.” This second step also involves a
change from the previous guideline, which required a court to first consider
aggravating factors and then subsequently consider mitigating factors.
Considering both kinds of factors simultaneously represents a more holistic
approach to the determination of seriousness.
The aggravating factors contained in the domestic burglary guideline
include committing the offense while on bail or licence and committing the
offense at night when a child was at home, while under the influence of alcohol
or drugs, or whilst the offender was on licence for a previous offense. The
guideline also specifies factors that reduce seriousness, including an absence of
prior convictions and the fact that the offender was a subordinate member of a
gang. Consistent with the relatively expansive perspective on mitigation
31
characteristic of sentencing in this jurisdiction, a diverse collection of factors is
cited as personal mitigation, including remorse, the fact that the offender was a
sole or primary carer for dependent relatives and, more controversially, “good
32
character and/or exemplary conduct.” Most importantly, the guideline makes
it clear that the list of factors at step two is, unlike step one, non-exhaustive.
The non-exhaustive nature of the list creates additional discretion for a court as
well as room for counsels’ submissions on personal mitigation to reflect the
highly variable circumstances of individual offenders.
G. Primary and Secondary Factors
The two-step format may be described as employing primary and secondary
factors to determine crime seriousness and culpability. Thus, step one considers
elements that have the most important influence on sentence severity—for

30. See SENTENCING COUNCIL, ASSAULT GUIDELINES 5 (2011), available at
http://sentencingcouncil.judiciary.gov.uk/docs/Assault_guideline_-_Response_to_the_consultation.pdf.
31. Ashworth, for example, notes that “in practice the range of factors advanced in mitigation is
enormously wide.” ASHWORTH, supra note 6, at 170.
32. It is controversial because this factor is unrelated to harm or culpability, and raises the
possibility that the offender is being sentenced for his character. For a discussion of the role of
mitigation and the effect of guidelines, see the exchange in Julian V. Roberts, Mike Hough & Andrew
Ashworth, Personal Mitigation, Public Opinion and Sentencing Guidelines in England and Wales, 2011
CRIM. L. REV. 524 and Austin Lovegrove, There Are More Things in the Public’s Sentencing Than in
Your Philosphy: A Response to Roberts, Hough and Ashworth, 2011 CRIM. L. REV. 531. For mitigation
and aggravation more generally, see MITIGATION AND AGGRAVATION AT SENTENCING (Julian V.
Roberts ed., 2011).

01_ROBERTS_BP (DO NOT DELETE)

No. 1 2013]

SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN ENGLAND AND WALES

3/19/2013 5:48 PM

9

example, the presence of a knife or other weapon where this is not the cause of
a separate criminal charge. Step two, on the other hand, identifies those
circumstances that are relevant to seriousness or culpability, but which should
carry less weight. The guideline does not actually make this primary–secondary
distinction explicit, although it may be implied by the phrase “principal factual
elements of the offence” to describe step one and “additional factual elements”
33
to describe step two.
It is always going to be challenging to ensure that the two stages are clearly
distinguishable. Some factors identified at step one may not be viewed by all as
primordial, and some factors assigned to step two may not be seen as secondary
in nature. For example, vandalizing the property may not always be more
important than committing an offense that results in the victim having to leave
her home, although the first circumstance is found in step one, the latter in step
two. Previous convictions provide another illustration of the complexities of
assigning sentencing factors to one of the two stages. Despite the fact that
criminal history is generally considered to be an important sentencing factor—
after all it is one of the statutory sentencing factors—it is consigned to step two,
where it will, for better or worse, have less impact on the quantum of
punishment.
H. Incorporating Thresholds for a Community Order and Custody
At step two, the guideline incorporates consideration of the statutory
34
thresholds for custody as opposed to community-based disposals. The
Criminal Justice Act 2003 articulates the sentencing principle of restraint with
respect to both the imposition of a term of custody and the duration of any
custodial term. Section 152(2) specifies that “[t]he court must not pass a
custodial sentence unless it is of the opinion that the offence, or the
combination of the offence and one or more offences associated with it, was so
serious that neither a fine alone nor a community sentence can be justified for
35
the offence.” Section 153(2) of the same statute states that “the custodial
sentence must be for the shortest term (not exceeding the permitted maximum)
that in the opinion of the court is commensurate with the seriousness of the
offence, or the combination of the offence and one or more offences associated
36
with it.”
The custodial threshold is now embedded in the guideline, an important
omission from the previous guidelines. Thus the new format guideline advises
that when sentencing category 2 or 3 offenses (the two less-serious categories),
the court should also consider (1) whether the custodial threshold has been
passed, (2) if it has been met, whether a custodial sentence is unavoidable, and

33.
34.
35.
36.

SENTENCING COUNCIL, supra note 23, at 8–9.
See Criminal Justice Act, 2003, c. 44, §§ 148(1), 152(2); see also Ashworth, supra note 6, at 300.
Criminal Justice Act, 2003, c. 44, § 152(2).
Id. § 153(2).
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finally (3) whether the sentence of imprisonment should be suspended. These
directions constitute a salutary reminder to sentencers of the statutory
requirement to consider the hierarchy of sanctions and the statutory criteria
that must be fulfilled before specific disposals are imposed. Under the previous
guideline, the statutory thresholds were cited only by cross-reference to the
guideline on overarching seriousness.
I. Additional Steps Towards Final Disposition
After step two, a court proceeds through the remaining seven steps of the
guidelines methodology, which may be briefly summarized. Step three directs
courts to take into account provisions in the Serious Organized Crime and
37
Police Act 2005 that permit a court to reduce sentence in cases where the
offender has provided (or offered to provide) assistance to the prosecution or
police. Any potential reduction here is independent of the reduction for the
guilty plea, although the utilitarian justification is the same in both cases.
Step four invokes sentence reductions for a guilty plea. Section 144 of the
Criminal Justice Act 2003 permits a court to reduce a sentence in cases where
38
the accused entered a guilty plea. The magnitude of the discount is not
specified in the statute, but guidance is provided in the definitive guideline
39
issued by the former Sentencing Guidelines Council. This guideline creates a
sliding scale of discounts according to which an offender is entitled to a
reduction of up to one third if the plea is entered at first reasonable
opportunity, with the reduction declining to one tenth for pleas entered only on
the day of the trial. This guidance is still in effect, although the Sentencing
40
Council has a statutory duty to issue a definitive guideline and will do at some
future point.
Step five requires courts to consider whether, having regard to the criteria
contained in chapter 5 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, it would be appropriate
41
to impose an extended sentence. The totality principle is invoked at step six
for cases in which the court is sentencing an offender for more than a single
offense, or where the offender is currently serving a sentence. This principle
requires courts to adjust the sentence to ensure that the total sentence is just
and proportionate to the offending behaviour.
Step seven reminds sentencers that in all cases they should consider whether
to make a compensation order and or any other ancillary orders. Section 174 of

37. Serious Organized Crime and Police Act, 2005, c. 15, §§ 73–74.
38. Criminal Justice Act, 2003, c. 44, § 144.
39. See SENTENCING COUNCIL, REDUCTION IN SENTENCE FOR A GUILTY PLEA 5–6 (2007),
available at http://sentencingcouncil.judiciary.gov.uk/docs/Reduction_in_Sentence_for_a_Guilty_Plea_Revised_2007.pdf.
40. Coroners and Justice Act, 2009, c. 25, § 120.
41. In 2012, the Council issued a guideline dealing with the application of the totality principle. See
SENTENCING COUNCIL, OFFENSES TAKEN INTO CONSIDERATION AND TOTALITY (2012), available at
http://sentencingcouncil.judiciary.gov.uk/docs/Definitive_guideline_TICs__totality_Final_web.pdf.
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the Criminal Justice Act 2003 imposes a duty on courts to give reasons and to
explain, for the benefit of the offender and others, the effect of the sentence,
and this duty is encapsulated in step eight. The final step (nine) directs courts to
consider whether to give credit for time spent on remand or on bail, in
accordance with sections 240 and 240A of the Criminal Justice Act 2003.
III
COMPLIANCE REQUIREMENT:
HOW BINDING ARE THE ENGLISH SENTENCING GUIDELINES?
Having described the structure of the guidelines, it is time to turn to the
most critical element of any guidelines scheme: the extent to which courts are
required to comply with the guidelines. In other jurisdictions the duty of a court
to follow guidelines is usually quite strict. One recent model for a compliance
42
provision is contained in the proposed New Zealand sentencing guidelines.
The statute regulating these guidelines states that “a court must impose a
sentence that is consistent with any sentencing guidelines that are relevant in
the offender’s case, unless the court is satisfied that it would be contrary to the
43
interests of justice to do so.”
The jurisdiction with the most experience with presumptive sentencing
guidelines is of course the United States, where guidelines exist in most states
and also at the federal level. Across the United States, most guideline systems
employ numerical, presumptively binding guidelines and with a more rigorous
compliance requirement than the New Zealand model. The Minnesota
guidelines are representative of these systems. The compliance requirement in
that state is that the sentencing judge must find, and record, “substantial and
compelling” reasons why the presumptive guidelines sentence would be too
44
high or too low in a given case.
The phrase “substantial and compelling reasons” implies that only a small
minority of sentences should fall outside the guidelines. This interpretation is
supported by the guidelines manual in that state, which notes that “[t]he
[departure] factors are intended to describe specific situations involving a small
45
number of cases.” Indeed, the Minnesota guidelines manual warns users that
“the purposes of the Guidelines cannot be achieved unless the presumptive
sentences are applied with a high degree of regularity. Sentencing disparity
cannot be reduced if courts depart from the Guidelines frequently, certainty in
46
sentencing cannot be attained if departure rates are high.”

42. See Young & Browning, supra note 3.
43. Sentencing Amendment Act 2007 § 12 (N.Z.).
44. MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMM’N, MINNESOTA SENTENCING GUIDELINES AND
COMMENTARY 2 (2012) (emphasis added), available at http://www.msgc.state.mn.us/guidelines/
2012%20MN%20Sentencing%20Guidelines%20and%20Commentary.pdf.
45. Id. at 46 (emphasis added).
46. Id. at 40 (emphasis added). Similarly, in the state of Oregon, the administrative rules relating
to the guidelines state that “the sentencing judge shall impose the presumptive sentence provided by
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A. England and Wales
The Coroners and Justice Act 2009 amended the requirement for courts
with respect to sentencing guidelines. According to the Criminal Justice Act
2003—the statute in force until passage of the Coroners and Justice Act in
2009—courts were directed that in sentencing an offender, they “must have
47
regard to any guidelines which are relevant to the offender’s case.” Section
174(2) of the same Act provided that “where guidelines indicate that a sentence
of a particular kind, or within a particular range, would normally be appropriate
for the offence and the sentence is of a different kind, or is outside that range,
state the court’s reasons for deciding on a sentence of a different kind or
48
outside that range.” Thus a court simply had to consider (“have regard to”)
the Council’s guidelines and to give reasons in the event that a “departure”
49
sentence was imposed.
B. The Current Compliance Requirement in England
The Coroners and Justice Act 2009 creates the following duty on a court
with respect to the guidelines:
(1) Every court—
(a) must, in sentencing an offender, follow any sentencing guidelines which are
relevant to the offender’s case, and
(b) must, in exercising any other function relating to the sentencing of offenders,
follow any sentencing guidelines which are relevant to the exercise of that
function,
unless the court is satisfied that it would be contrary to the interests of justice to do
so. . . .
(3) the duty imposed on a court by subsection (1)(a) to follow any sentencing
guidelines which are relevant to the offender’s case includes –
(a) in all cases, a duty to impose on P, in accordance with the offence-specific
guidelines, a sentence which is within the offence range, and
(b) where the offence-specific guidelines describe categories of case in
accordance with section 121(2), a duty to decide which of the categories most
resembles P’s case in order to identify the sentencing starting point in the
offence range;
but nothing in this section imposes on the court a separate duty, 50in a case within
paragraph (b), to impose a sentence which is within the category range.

The relatively robust language “must . . . follow” is therefore qualified by
the words creating the discretion to impose a different sentence if following the
guidelines would not be in the interests of justice. In addition, the statute

the guidelines unless the judge finds substantial and compelling reasons to impose a departure.” OR.
ADMIN. R. 213-008-001 (2012), available at http://www.oregon.gov/CJC/SG.shtml.
47. Criminal Justice Act, 2003, c. 44, § 172(1).
48. Id. § 174(2).
49. Id. § 172.
50. Coroners and Justice Act, 2009, c. 25, § 125 (emphasis added).
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51

clarifies what is meant by the duty to sentence within a range. As noted, most
offenses are stratified into several levels of seriousness, each with its own range
of sentence. The duty on courts is to sentence within the total offense range,
rather than the narrower range associated with any particular category of
52
seriousness. The total offense range is relatively wide and naturally increases
to reflect the seriousness of the offense. For example, domestic burglary carries
a total sentence range of a low-level community order to six years in custody; a
court may sentence anywhere in this range and still be compliant with the
53
guidelines.
More serious offenses carry a much wider range of sentence within which a
court may impose a sentence and remain compliant with the guidelines. For
robbery, a court may impose a custodial sentence of up to twelve years in length
and remain compliant with the guidelines—a degree of discretion that has been
54
criticized by some commentators for being too permissive. In the event that
the court imposes a sentence outside the overall range—in the interests of
justice—it must give reasons for its decision. The provisions in the Coroners and
Justice Act 2009 focus a court’s attention on the relevance of the guidelines, yet
55
permit considerable judicial discretion to impose a fit sentence.
C. Sentencing Outside the Total Offense Range
As noted, the total offense range for domestic burglary runs from a lowlevel community order up to six-years custody, yet the maximum penalty for
this offense is fourteen-years imprisonment when tried on indictment. A
custodial “zone” therefore exists between the guideline range ceiling of six
years and the statutory limit of fourteen-years imprisonment. For the most
serious offenses, this zone between the ceiling of the total offense range and the
statutory maximum will be greater than the eight-year range for domestic
burglary. Accordingly, a natural question to pose is, what is the relationship
between a definitive guideline and the statutory maximum? Answering the
question requires a brief reflection on the role of a guideline.
Sentencing guidelines provide courts with guidance as to the appropriate
disposals for most cases; they do not encompass cases falling at the extremes of
mitigation or aggravation. It is to be anticipated that most cases will be
accommodated within the total offense range specified by the guideline;

51. The relevant provision in the Criminal Justice Act 2003 did not specify whether compliance
entailed sentencing within the category range or the wider offense range, although a number of
appellate decisions endorsed the former interpretation. See Julian V. Roberts, Sentencing Guidelines
and Judicial Discretion: Evolution of the Duty of Courts to Comply in England and Wales, 51 BRIT. J.
CRIMINOLOGY 997, 5 (2011).
52. For further discussion, see id.
53. See SENTENCING COUNCIL, supra note 23, at 8–9, available at http://sentencingcouncil.
judiciary.gov.uk/docs/Burglary_Definitive_Guideline_web_final.pdf.
54. Andrew Ashworth, Coroners and Justice Act 2009: Sentencing Guidelines and the Sentencing
Council, 2010 CRIM. L. REV. 389.
55. See Roberts, supra note 51.
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however, there will be a small number of cases that fall into the most serious
category (category 1) yet for whom a term of custody in excess of six years is
proportionate. Equally, some cases conforming to the lowest level of
seriousness category may warrant a disposal less punitive than a fine.
Imposition of a sentence beneath a low-level community order (the floor of the
total offense range) would require justification. Using the language of the
statute, this justification would entail an explanation of why it would be
“contrary to the interests of justice” to impose a sentence within the guideline
56
total offense range.
IV
EMERGING ISSUES AND CHALLENGES TO THE GUIDELINES
A. Compliance Rates
Compliance statistics are routinely collected and published by the U.S.
sentencing commissions. One of the curiosities of the English guidelines is that
comprehensive compliance statistics have never been published. The
explanation for this is that the previous guidelines authorities had neither the
mandate nor the resources to take the appropriate steps to collect such data. As
the first statutory body created to promote guidelines (in 1998), the Sentencing
Advisory Panel was preoccupied with promoting the guidelines—a necessary
first step before compliance could be measured. The SGC co-sponsored a large
57
data collection exercise in 2006, but this research was terminated before data
became available. The new Council has a statutory duty to monitor the
58
“operation and effect of its sentencing guidelines.” More specifically, the
Council must “discharge its duty . . . with a view to drawing conclusions about
the frequency with which, and the extent to which, courts depart from
59
sentencing guidelines.”
B. Compliance Trends
In 2012 the Sentencing Council issued the first year’s worth of data from its
60
survey of Crown Court Sentencing Survey (CCSS). This survey requires
Crown court judges to complete a form summarizing the key elements of the
sentencing decision, including the critical question of whether the sentence
imposed was within or outside the guidelines. The first statistical release does

56. Coroners and Justice Act, 2009, c. 25, § 125(1)(b).
57. See generally MANDEEP DHAMI AND KAREN SOUZA, SENTENCING AND ITS OUTCOMES
PROJECT:
PART
ONE
PILOT
STUDY
REPORT
(2009),
available
at
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20110201125714/http://www.justice.gov.uk/publications/sente
ncing-outcomes-research.htm.
58. Coroners and Justice Act 2009 § 128(1)(a).
59. Id. § 128(2)(a).
60. SENTENCING COUNCIL, CROWN COURT SENTENCING SURVEY (2012), available at
http://sentencingcouncil.judiciary.gov.uk/docs/CCSS_Annual_2011.pdf.
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not provide “departure” statistics for all sentences imposed but only for three
assault offenses; subsequent releases will presumably provide comprehensive
statistics on this issue.
With respect to the three offenses for which compliance data were released
(assault occasioning actual bodily harm), the statistics confirm the expectation
that having defined compliance in terms of the total offense range (rather than
the category-specific range), very few dispositions will fall outside the
compliance zone. For the three offenses, as expected, almost all sentences fall
within the guidelines range. For two of the assault offenses, only three percent
of sentences fell outside the guidelines range, while for the third offense eight
61
percent were outside the range.
C. Role of Guidelines in Responding to Punitive Surges
One of the functions of sentencing guidelines is to serve as a “circuit
breaker,” preventing bursts of punitiveness from affecting sentencing
62
practices. One obvious source of increased severity is the legislature, where
politicians sometimes introduce tough mandatory sentences that distort
sentencing practices and undermine principles such as proportionality and
63
restraint.
A less obvious source of episodic punitiveness is the judiciary itself. If courts
have great discretion at sentencing, and appellate courts intervene only
relatively rarely, individual sentencers may feel emboldened to periodically
pursue harsher than normal sentencing in an attempt to curb rising crime rates.
For example, sentencers may draw upon their personal observations of a local
rise in offending to impose “exemplary,” punitive sentences. It may also be the
case that the judicial culture in some jurisdictions is more responsive to public
pressure to “get tough” with offenders. Some researchers have argued that the
courts in England have been influenced by a public desire to punish offenders
64
more severely. For example, sensitivity to public pressure has been cited as
65
one cause of the sharp rise in the prison population in England since 1995. This

61. Id. at 26–28.
62. Another constraint on responsive bursts of punitiveness would be some kind of delay—waiting
until the punitive atmosphere triggered by such mass disorder dissipates. The courts in August and
September wasted little time in sentencing offenders convicted of riot-related offending. Incorporating
some kind of “second look” at sentencing beyond the conventional avenue of appellate review might
also prevent excessive sentencing at times of high emotion, although no such mechanism exists in
England and Wales.
63. A good example is Canada, where the federal government has been introducing mandatory
sentences of imprisonment for the last few years; the latest draft of such sentences are contained in An
Act to Enact the Justice for Victims of Terrorism Act and to Amend the State Immunity Act, the
Criminal Code, the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, the Corrections and Conditional Release
Act, the Youth Criminal Justice Act, the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act and Other Acts.
Bill, 2011, H.C., Bill [C-10].
64. See, e.g., M. HOUGH ET AL., THE DECISION TO IMPRISON: SENTENCING AND THE PRISON
POPULATION 26 (2003).
65. Andrew Millie et al., Understanding the Growth in the Prison Population in England and
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jurisdiction may be more susceptible than most to such pressures in light of the
fact that most sentencing decisions (approximately ninety-seven percent in
2009) are taken by lay magistrates. One of the justifications for lay sentencing is
to incorporate community values to a greater degree than may be possible with
a professional judiciary.
D. Sentencing Offenders Convicted of Offenses During the 2011 Riots
A guidelines scheme would (and should) constrain both legislators and
sentencers from periodic surges of punitiveness. In August 2011, the
extraordinary riots taking place in a number of English cities created an
unexpected and unwelcome challenge for the guidelines. Over three
consecutive nights, large numbers of individuals participated in mass looting in
several cities including Birmingham, Manchester, London, and Bristol. Charges
were laid for a wide range of offenses including burglary of a commercial
property, receiving stolen goods, and theft.
The judiciary responded expeditiously to the individuals convicted of
offenses occurring during this period; in doing so, some judgments undermined
the guidelines by affirming that the offense was so far removed from
conventional offending to render the sentencing guidelines irrelevant.
Considerable controversy arose over a memo sent around magistrates’ courts
by a legal advisor. The email advised courts to depart from the guidelines,
asserting that “[t]he Sentencing Guidelines cannot sensibly be used to
determine the sentence in cases arising from the recent disturbance/looting.
66
When the guidelines were written, nothing like this was envisaged.” This
memo attracted considerable commentary in the news media and seemed to
suggest that courts would disregard the guidelines in all cases.
An early judgment, issued by the Manchester Recorder following
consultation with fellow judges in that city, is particularly significant. After
noting that the context of the offenses committed takes them “completely
outside the usual context of criminality,” the court in R. v. Carter assumed the
67
view that existing sentencing guidelines “can properly be departed from.” The
judgment then outlines new starting point sentences and sentencing ranges for a
68
wide range of offenses. The Manchester Recorder’s “guidelines” were

Wales, in THE PERSISTENT PRISON: PROBLEMS, IMAGES AND ALTERNATIVES 102–04 (Clive Emsley
ed., 2005).
66. The memo was ultimately made public by the Ministry of Justice in response to a Freedom of
Information request.
67. Sentencing Remarks, R. v. Carter, [2011] EW Misc 12 (CrownC). See also Julian Baggini,
Guilty?: Can the Harsh Sentences Being Handed to Last Week’s Rioters Be Justified?, GUARDIAN
(London), Aug. 18, 2011, at 4, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2011/aug/17/england-riotsharsh-sentences-justified (under the title England Riots: Are Harsh Sentences for Offenders Justified?).
68. Sentencing Remarks, R. v. Carter, [2011] EW Misc 12 (CrownC). The criminal justice system
could not be faulted for being slow to respond; many offenders were located, charged, brought to court
and having entered guilty pleas were sentenced less than a week after the offenses had been committed.
Ten cases were then heard by the Court of Appeal within a month.
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immediately followed by a number of judgments from other courts, all of which
69
70
endorsed the Carter ranges. A typical example is found in R. v. Twemlow.
One of these offenders (McGrath) had entered a previously looted supermarket
where he was arrested by police and subsequently pleaded guilty to burglary of
a business premise. The twenty-one-year-old offender, a university student, was
regarded by the court as of good character, and a pre-sentence report
recommended imposition of a non-custodial sanction. The definitive guideline
for burglary in a building other than a dwelling in effect at the time has three
levels of seriousness. The lowest level applies to burglary involving goods
valued under £2,000 and carries a range of a fine to six-months custody with a
starting point sentence of a community order. This would appear to be the
relevant category for the McGrath case. In the event, the court sentenced this
offender to twenty-four-months imprisonment, reduced to eighteen months to
reflect the early guilty plea. This case provides some indication of the
aggravating power of the riot context, at least as manifest in this early judgment.
E. Sentencing Ranges in the “Ersatz” Guidelines
How much higher are the sentence length ranges specified in the Carter
decision? Although the judgment notes that the current guidelines are “of much
less weight in the context of the current case,” the Carter guidelines must be
seen in some context. Direct comparisons between the existing definitive
guidelines and those in Carter are complicated by differences in guideline
structures; nevertheless, some conclusions may reasonably be drawn. A
comprehensive comparison is beyond the scope of a brief commentary; one
common offense may serve as an illustration: burglary from a non-dwelling.
As noted, the Sentencing Guidelines Council definitive guideline for
burglary in a building other than a dwelling was still in effect at the time of the
71
riots; it stipulates a sentence range of a fine to twenty-six weeks custody for
property valued under £2,000. The SGC guideline applies to a first offender, so
the twenty-six weeks should be increased somewhat for the purposes of
comparison. If we consider the upper limit for this level of the offense to be
higher, say, forty weeks to reflect this consideration, the aggravating effect of
the riot context is nevertheless very striking. Under Carter, a burglar who takes
part in breaking into a business premise is subject to a sentence length range

69. See Sentencing Remarks, R. v. Twemlow, [2011] EW Misc 14 (CrownC). The Court noted the
following: “I expressly agree with the observations of HHJ Gilbart QC. In passing sentence he set out
the ranges of sentences which are to be imposed. I respectfully agree with those ranges.” Id.
70. Id.
71. As noted, the Sentencing Council has issued a definitive guideline for non-domestic burglary.
See SENTENCING GUIDELINES COUNCIL, NON-DOMESTIC BURGLARY: THEFT ACT 1968, available at
http://sentencingcouncil.judiciary.gov.uk/docs/Burglary_Definitive_Guideline_Magistrates_web.pdf. If
we compare the Carter ranges with the appropriate range of sentence identified in the new guideline,
the same conclusion emerges: the ranges contained in the Carter judgment are much higher. The range
for the middle level of seriousness in the new guideline runs from a low-level community order to fiftyone-weeks custody, far short of the seven-year maximum established by the Manchester judges.
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72

with an upper limit of 364 weeks (seven years). The aggravating impact of the
antecedent events at the time of the offending thus has a dramatic impact on the
severity of punishments.
The challenge to the guidelines was therefore two-fold. First, the ad hoc
sentencing ranges reflect a high degree of aggravation that undermines the
integrity of the guidelines; second, by prescribing a new set of starting points
and sentence ranges for a raft of offenses, the judgment effectively creates an
additional level of guidelines authority: local courts. Let us address these two
issues in turn.
F. Impact of Aggravating Factors on Proportionate Sentencing
Aggravating factors at sentencing should enhance the quantum of
punishment in proportion to the elevated harm of the offense or culpability of
the offender. The extent to which factor X aggravates the sentence in case Y is
73
properly left to judicial discretion. It is impossible for Parliament to decide a
priori that any given circumstance should increase the quantum of punishment
by say, one-quarter or one-half in all cases. To do so would deprive sentencing
of the individualization necessary to achieve a just and proportionate sentence.
A guideline can offer some guidance on the appropriate range of sentence
resulting from an aggravating circumstance.
74
The reduction for a guilty plea is a good example. At present, the definitive
guideline recommends that a court reduce the sentence by up to one-third, in
75
the event that the defendant entered a plea at the earliest opportunity. Courts
retain the discretion to award a greater reduction in exceptional cases, but such
cases will be rare and will entail the court invoking the interests of justice
provision in the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 to step outside the guideline
76
maximum of one-third. If courts were allowed (or encouraged) to select any
magnitude of discount, consistency and indeed proportionality in sentencing
would be threatened. The same may be said for aggravation; the impact of an
aggravating factor should be constrained by the gravity of the predicate conduct
of the offense of conviction. If the tariff for, say, a common assault without
injury to the victim were a community order, the sentence should not rise to
several years in prison in the event that the assault was aggravated by being

72. If we consider fifteen weeks as an approximate midpoint of the existing guideline and five and
one-half years (286 weeks) as the midpoint of the enhanced guideline, the latter is much longer than the
former. See Sentencing Remarks, R. v. Carter, [2011] EW Misc 12 (CrownC).
73. This is one reason why legislatures and guidelines authorities around the world have declined
to provide guidance as to the quantum of aggravation or mitigation associated with sentencing factors.
74. The Coroners and Justice Act 2009 directs the Sentencing Council to issue a guideline on the
reduction for a guilty plea and a draft guideline will be issued at a later point. Coroners and Justice Act,
2009, c. 25, § 120(3)(a).
75. SENTENCING COUNCIL, REDUCTION IN SENTENCE FOR A GUILTY PLEA 5–6 (2007), available
at http://sentencingcouncil.judiciary.gov.uk/docs/Reduction_in_Sentence_for_a_Guilty_Plea_-Revised_
2007.pdf.
76. Coroners and Justice Act, 2009, c. 44, § 125(1).
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racially motivated—or this would constitute a classic case of the tail wagging the
dog.
G. Threat to Ordinal Proportionality
Ordinal proportionality is one of the requirements of desert-based
sentencing. This requires offenses of differing seriousness to receive sentences
77
of commensurate severity. Rank-ordering is one of the sub-requirements of
ordinal proportionality: offenses ranked differently in terms of their relative
seriousness should receive commensurably distinguishable penalties.
There is a clear threat to ordinal proportionality when aggravating or
mitigating factors have the power to increase or reduce the sentence to a great
extent. Rankings of seriousness will be scrambled: an offense of relatively low
seriousness will be punished at a level of severity associated with a much more
serious offense. Moreover, proportionality is not restricted to comparisons
within crimes of the same offense; it permeates the entire spectrum of
offending. Sentencing must be considered in this broader perspective. To take
an obvious example, punishing serious frauds more harshly than theft preserves
proportionality across economic offenses, but if serious frauds result in the
imposition of a harsher disposal than, say, manslaughter, ordinal proportion78
ality would be threatened.
The second threat to the guidelines involves the introduction of a new
source of guidance, created spontaneously by a group of trial judges without the
imprimatur of the Court of Appeal or the statutory guidelines authority (the
Sentencing Council). In Carter, the court laid down sentencing guidelines
ranges for a variety of offenses associated with riot-related offenses. In addition,
the text of the judgment provides what are effectively “starting points,” when it
notes, “As a starting point . . . any adult offender . . . who took part in crimes of
the type I have described . . . must expect to lose his or [her] liberty for a
79
significant period.” The language suggests a judicial presumption of custody in
all cases.
Since they were developed in relation to behaviour defined as outside the
scope of current guidelines, it is unsurprising that they are at odds with existing
definitive guidelines issued by the Sentencing Council and its predecessors.
80
Moreover, unlike the definitive guidelines which courts must follow, the
Manchester guidelines were not developed after any systematic research,
without a protracted public and professional consultation, and were not subject
81
to any parliamentary scrutiny. In short, they represent the personal sentencing

77. See ANDREW VON HIRSCH, CENSURE AND SANCTIONS 18–19 (Clarendon Press 1993).
78. This is why guidelines authorities generally devise guidelines for all offenses simultaneously,
rather than developing them seriatim on an offense-by-offense basis, as has been the case in England
and Wales.
79. Sentencing Remarks, R. v. Carter, [2011] EW Misc 12, at 6 (CrownC) (emphasis added).
80. According to section 125(1)(a) of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009.
81. These steps are all necessary before the Sentencing Council issues a definitive guideline. See
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preferences of a small group of judges in one city—ersatz guidelines, if you like.
It would be inappropriate for courts in other cities to follow the Manchester
guidelines. If this occurred, it would mark the introduction of another player in
the already-crowded sentencing environment. Thus, Parliament creates the
statutory framework (including sentencing objectives and certain sentencing
82
principles); the Court of Appeal periodically issues guideline judgments; the
Sentencing Council devises and issues definitive guidelines; and now local
courts have evolved their own tariffs and ranges.
The importance of ensuring that guidance emanates from the Council or
Court of Appeal is not restricted to rare occurrences such as the August riots.
Although the sentencing “guidelines” which arose in August 2011 did so in
relation to a rare event, less dramatic instances of local court initiatives may
well arise. For example, if courts perceive a sudden rise in a particular form of
criminality in their area, they may decide to impose exemplary sentences by
setting higher ranges in the interests of deterring such conduct.
H. Response of the Sentencing Council and the Court of Appeal
How did the legitimate sources of guidance respond to the sentences
imposed in the riot cases, and in particular the Manchester Recorder’s
guidelines? The Sentencing Council discussed riot-related sentencing and issued
a press statement to the effect that the Court of Appeal would shortly be
hearing appeals arising from sentencing decisions involving riot-related
83
offending and that the Council would not be commenting further. One reason
why the Council did not issue a substantive response was that in order to issue a
revised guideline or a new definitive guideline dealing with offending during a
period of social disorder, the Council would have a statutory duty to follow
several steps, including an extensive period of public consultation lasting several
84
months. The Court of Appeal, however, can act more expeditiously once it has
received an appeal, and it had rather more to say in a lengthy judgment issued
in October 2011.
85

I. R. v. Blackshaw

On the critical issue of relevance to this article, the Court of Appeal took a
clear position. It noted that “[i]t is however inappropriate for Crown Court

Coroners and Justice Act, 2009, c. 25, § 120(5)–(6).
82. See, e.g., R. v. Saw, [2009] EWCA (Crim) 1.
83. Statement Following Council Discussion on Sentencing for Offences Committed During the
August Riots, SENTENCING COUNCIL (Sept. 16, 2011), http://sentencingcouncil.judiciary.gov.uk/newsstories.htm. The Council did incorporate a new factor of committing the offense in the “context of
general public disorder” in the next guideline it produced, relating to the sentencing of burglary
offenses. SENTENCING COUNCIL, BURGLARY OFFENCES DEFINITIVE GUIDELINE 8 (2011), available
at http://sentencingcouncil.judiciary.gov.uk/docs/Burglary_Definitive_Guideline_web_final.pdf.
84. See Coroners and Justice Act, 2009, c.25, § 120 (5)–(6).
85. R. v. Blackshaw, [2011] EWCA (Crim) 2312.
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judges to issue, or appear to be issuing, sentencing guidelines.” In this sense
the Court disagreed with the Manchester Recorder . However, the two courts
were in agreement that the riot-related offending was of a nature not envisaged
by—and therefore not encompassed within—the existing guidelines. The Court
of Appeal quoted and endorsed the Manchester’s recorder’s judgment: “. . . the
context in which the offences of the 9th August were committed takes them
completely outside the usual context of criminality, . . . For these reasons I
consider that the Sentencing Guidelines for specific offences are of much less
87
weight in the context of the current case [and] can properly be departed from.”
Blackshaw therefore strengthens the role of guidelines in one respect—
noting that only the Council and the Court of Appeal have the authority to
issue sentencing guidelines. But at the same time, in reviewing the specific cases
on appeal, the Court provided no link to the offense-specific guidelines as a
point of departure, nor any link to an important generic guideline—namely that
88
of over-arching seriousness. The offense-specific guidelines may be of limited
utility in sentencing riot-related offending (except as a point of departure), but
the principles guiding the determination of seriousness apply across the entire
range of crime seriousness—which is why it is an overarching guideline in the
first place. In fact, the guideline ranges are sufficiently high to accommodate
aggravation of this kind, even though it was not anticipated when the guideline
was constructed. Had courts not abandoned the guidelines so readily they could
have drawn upon the many sources of guidance and still imposed enhanced
89
sentences.
J. Achieving Consistency
Communications dealing with the guidelines or emanating from the
Sentencing Council repeatedly stress that the aim is to promote consistency of
approach rather than consistency of outcome, although greater consistency in
the way that sentencers around the country approach sentencing will surely
promote more consistent outcomes. The challenge to a guidelines authority is to
ensure that the guidelines are followed. In the English context, however, it is
worth noting that a number of elements permit considerable latitude to a court
at sentencing, and it is worth recapitulating these at this point.
1. First, the enabling statute permits a court to impose a sentence outside the
guidelines, if it would not be in the interests of justice to follow them—the
‘departure’ provision;
2. Second, compliance with the guideline is defined by the statute as imposing

86. Id. at ¶ 20.
87. Id. at ¶ 17.
88. SENTENCING GUIDELINES COUNCIL, OVERARCHING PRINCIPLES: SERIOUSNESS (2004),
available at http://sentencingcouncil.judiciary.gov.uk/docs/Web_Seriousness_Guideline.pdf.
89. For a discussion of how courts sentencing riot-related offending could have benefited from the
guidelines, see Julian V. Roberts, Points of Departure: Reflections on Sentencing Outside the Definitive
Guidelines Ranges, 2012 CRIM. L. REV. 439.
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a sentence within the relatively wide total offense range—not the more
restrictive category range—the difference between the two ranges being
very large;
3. Third, movement between the categories of seriousness is permitted: having
determined that a particular category range is appropriate, a court may
nevertheless later move into a higher or lower category if there is a
sufficient constellation of aggravating or mitigating factors.
There is therefore a high degree of flexibility—courts are able to move
around within the guidelines and are not restricted to a particular category-level
range; as well, they may escape the guidelines altogether by means of the
“interests of justice” test. Ultimately, consistency will arise not through
restrictive limits on the sentencing discretion in any particular case, but by the
imposition of a step-by-step methodology. The idea is, presumably, that if all
sentencers follow the same method, a more consistent approach will be the
consequence and consistency will ensue.
Critics of the English guidelines and the statutory provisions regulating their
application may argue that the degree of flexibility permitted by both will result
in only modest gains in terms of consistency and predictability of outcomes.
Time will tell; no evaluation research has yet been conducted to determine the
effect of the guidelines on sentencing practices in trial courts. Once the newformat guidelines have been given an opportunity to “bed down,” it should be
possible to conduct some analyses of sentencing practices before and after
introduction of a specific guideline. It is clear, however, that a more restrictive
regime, with a tighter compliance requirement, would almost certainly have
90
proved unacceptable to the judiciary in England.
K. Guidelines and the Prison Population
This article has explored the nature and function of the English guidelines.
Perhaps it is worth commenting on what these guidelines do not do. The
Sentencing Commission Working Group lamented the inability to make prison
91
projections with a degree of accuracy found in states such as Minnesota. This is
one reason why the Working Group recommended a tighter compliance
requirement—to ensure that a higher proportion of sentences fell within the
guidelines ranges; only once this occurred would prison population projections
become more precise.
However, the English guidelines were not designed to constrain prison
admissions, and, ironically, the first decade under the guidelines also witnessed
92
an increase in the size of the prison population. This growth in the prison
90. The judiciary encompasses lay magistrates courts as well as Crown courts. It is possible that lay
magistrates would have found a more restrictive guidelines regime acceptable, since they have been
using a set of guidelines applicable to their jurisdiction for a longer period of time.
91. SENTENCING COMMISSION WORKING GROUP, supra note 10, at 14.
92. The guidelines were not responsible for this increase of course, which was triggered by a
number of factors such as an increased tendency to use custody, independent of any changes in the
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population was incremental and long-term, but the guidelines also fail to
contain short-term bursts in punitiveness of the kind discussed in this article.
Guidelines advocates who believe that guidelines should be responsive to—and
constrain—prison populations will see this feature of the English arrangements
as a clear weakness.
The problem is exacerbated because the statutory language of the custodial
threshold is not particularly rigorous. Thus, section 152(2) of the Criminal
Justice Act 2003 provides that the court must not pass a custodial sentence
unless it is of the opinion that the offense, or the combination of the offense and
one or more of the offenses associated with it, was so serious that neither a fine
93
alone nor a community order can be justified for the offense.
This highlights perhaps the most problematic element of sentencing in this
jurisdiction: the subjective threshold for the imposition of a term of custody.
This provision has manifestly failed to constrain the use of custody as a
sanction—but that is a story for another day.
V
CONCLUSION
A number of jurisdictions are actively contemplating adopting more
structured sentencing regimes, including some form of guidelines. The
guidelines in England represent a useful model for consideration in this respect.
It is too early to know definitively whether the guidelines have promoted moreconsistent sentencing in this country, although there is a strong prima facie case
that sentencing is likely to be more consistent—in light of the methodical
approach to determining sentence, and the high rates of judicial compliance.
Critics may argue that the guidelines still leave too much discretion to
individual sentencers, but tighter guidelines would likely have proven
impossible to implement.

nature of cases appearing for sentencing, and the imposition of longer terms of custody as a result of
statutory changes to the sentencing framework. See Andrew Millie et al., supra note 58.
93. Criminal Justice Act, 2003, c. 44, § 152(2).
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VI
APPENDIX A:
EXAMPLE OF SENTENCING GUIDELINE STRUCTURE IN ENGLAND
94

Offense: Domestic burglary
Maximum Penalty: 14-years custody (when tried on indictment)
Total Offense Range: Low-level community order to 6-years custody
Step 1: Use the factors provided in the guideline that comprise the principal
95
elements of the offense to determine the category that is appropriate:
Category 1: Greater harm and high culpability;
Category 2: Greater harm and lower culpability or lesser harm and higher culpability;
Category 3: Lesser harm and lower culpability.

Step 2: Use the starting point from the appropriate offense category to generate
a provisional sentence within the category range. The starting point applies to
all offenders irrespective of plea and previous convictions. The guideline
contains a list of additional aggravating and mitigating factors. These factors
96
97
affect crime seriousness or relate to personal mitigation and should result in
upward or downward adjustment from the starting point.
Offense Category
1.
2.

Starting Point
3-years custody
12-months custody

3.

High-level community order

Category Sentence Range
2- to 6-years custody
High-level community order to
2-years custody
Low-level community order to
26-weeks custody

Step 3: Consider if any reduction should be made to reflect assistance offered or
provided to the prosecution.
Step 4: Consider the level of reduction appropriate to reflect a guilty plea.
94. Theft Act, 1996, c. 62.
95. For example, factors indicating greater harm include violence used or threatened against
victim, and soiling, ransacking, or vandalism of property. Factors indicating higher culpability include a
significant degree of premeditation. Factors indicating lesser harm include limited damage or
disturbance to property, and factors indicating lower culpability include when the offender was
exploited by others.
96. For example, factors such as gratuitous degradation of the victim and offense committed while
offender on license.
97. For example, factors such as remorse, no previous convictions, no relevant or recent
convictions, and offender is sole carer for dependent relatives.
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Step 5: Consider whether the offender meets dangerousness criteria necessary
98
for imposition of an indeterminate or extended sentence.
Step 6: If sentencing for more than one offense, apply the totality principle to
ensure that the total sentence is just and proportionate to the total offending
behavior.
Step 7: Consider whether to make a compensation order and/or other orders.
Step 8: Give reasons for and explain the effect of the sentence on the offender.
Step 9: Consider whether to give credit for time on remand or bail.

98. For example, sentences such as a life sentence, imprisonment for public protection (IPP), or an
extended sentence.

